# Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement

## TL;DR

This paper argues that Thomsonian constitutivism cannot adequately explain changes in values or disagreements about them.

## Contribution

The paper introduces value change as a distinct phenomenon and argues it is not explained by constitutivism.

## Key findings

- Constitutivism fails to explain value change and disagreement due to its reliance on goodness-fixing kinds.
- The view can at best explain new values, not genuine change.
- Thomsonian constitutivism is insufficient for realist problems in metaethics.

## Abstract

We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.