# Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?

## TL;DR

This paper critiques a theory that tries to incorporate a de minimis principle based on abnormality into expected utility decision-making.

## Contribution

The paper presents three new arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory.

## Key findings

- The normic de minimis principle may not adequately address all decision-making scenarios.
- The theory's reliance on abnormality as a threshold for risk is problematic.
- The integration of de minimis into expected utility theory faces significant challenges.

## Abstract

Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.