Brain mechanisms discriminating enactive mental simulations of running and plogging

TL;DR

The study explores how the brain distinguishes between imagining running and plogging, revealing specific brain networks involved in these mental simulations.

Contribution

The paper identifies brain regions and functional connectivity patterns specific to enactive mental simulations of plogging versus running.

Findings

Brain activation patterns differ significantly between mental simulations of plogging and running.

Self-reported running engagement and simulation quality modulate brain reactivity to plogging versus running.

The insular cortex shows increased functional connectivity during plogging simulations compared to running.

Abstract

Enactive cognition emphasizes co‐constructive roles of humans and their environment in shaping cognitive processes. It is specifically engaged in the mental simulation of behaviors, enhancing the connection between perception and action. Here we investigated the core network of brain regions involved in enactive cognition as applied to mental simulations of physical exercise. We used a neuroimaging paradigm in which participants (N = 103) were required to project themselves running or plogging (running while picking‐up litter) along an image‐guided naturalistic trail. Using both univariate and multivariate brain imaging analyses, we find that a broad spectrum of brain activation discriminates between the mental simulation of plogging versus running. Critically, we show that self‐reported ratings of daily life running engagement and the quality of mental simulation (how well participants were able to imagine themselves running) modulate the brain reactivity to plogging versus running. Finally, we undertook functional connectivity analyses centered on the insular cortex, which is a key region in the dynamic interplay between neurocognitive processes. This analysis revealed increased positive and negative patterns of insular‐centered functional connectivity in the plogging condition (as compared to the running condition), thereby confirming the key role of the insular cortex in action simulation involving complex sets of mental mechanisms. Taken together, the present findings provide new insights into the brain networks involved in the enactive mental simulation of physical exercise.

In an image‐guided naturalistic trail featuring mental simulation of running (part 1.A.) or plogging (part 1.A.), using both univariate (parts 2.A and 2.B.) and multivariate (part 2.C.) brain imaging analyses, we find that a broad spectrum of brain activation discriminates between the mental simulation of plogging versus running. These findings provide new insights into the brain networks involved in the enactive mental simulation of physical exercise.

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