# Severity and death

**Authors:** Adam Ehlert

PMC · DOI: 10.1007/s11019-024-10193-z · Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy · 2024-02-08

## TL;DR

This paper explores how theories about the badness of death relate to methods for measuring severity in healthcare decisions.

## Contribution

It highlights the alignment between the Life-Comparative Account and Absolute Shortfall, supporting the latter's use.

## Key findings

- The Life-Comparative Account aligns closely with Absolute Shortfall.
- Proportional Shortfall lacks support from death badness theories.
- The Gradualist Account is not well-supported by severity theories.

## Abstract

This article discusses the relationship between two theories about the badness of death, the Life-Comparative Account and the Gradualist Account, and two methods of operationalizing severity in health care priority setting, Absolute Shortfall and Proportional Shortfall. The aim is that theories about the badness of death can influence and inform the idea of the basis of severity as a priority setting criterion. I argue that there are strong similarities between the Life-Comparative Account and Absolute Shortfall, and since the Life-Comparative Account is one of the most reasonable accounts of the badness of death, this provides some support for using Absolute Shortfall. I also argue that it is difficult to find support for Proportional Shortfall from theories about the badness of death, and also, that it is difficult to find support for Gradualist Account from theories about severity.

## Full-text entities

- **Diseases:** death (MESH:D003643)

## Full text

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## References

40 references — full list in the complete paper: https://tomesphere.com/paper/PMC11076339/full.md

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Source: https://tomesphere.com/paper/PMC11076339