TimeGuard: Channel-wise Pool Training for Backdoor Defense in Time Series Forecasting
Quang Duc Nguyen, Siyuan Liang, Yiming Li, Fushuo Huo, Dacheng Tao

TL;DR
TimeGuard is a novel training-time defense for time series forecasting that uses channel-wise pooling and dynamic pool expansion to effectively detect and mitigate backdoor attacks, outperforming existing methods.
Contribution
The paper introduces TimeGuard, a new backdoor defense method for TSF that addresses data entanglement and task-shift issues with channel-wise pooling and adaptive loss strategies.
Findings
TimeGuard boosts robustness, increasing MAE_P by 1.96x over baselines.
It maintains clean performance within 5% MAE_C.
Extensive experiments validate its effectiveness across datasets and attack types.
Abstract
Time Series Forecasting (TSF) plays a critical role across many domains, yet it is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. However, backdoor defenses tailored to TSF remain underexplored, due to data entanglement and task-formulation shift challenges. To fill this gap, we conduct a systematic evaluation of thirteen representative backdoor defenses across the TSF life cycle and analyze their failure modes. Our results reveal two fundamental issues: (1) data entanglement induces channel-level signal dilution, rendering sample-filtering and trigger-synthesis defenses ineffective at localizing backdoors; and (2) task-formulation shift leads to training-loss degeneration, causing poisoned and clean windows to become indistinguishable at training stages. Based on these findings, we propose a training-time backdoor defense for TSF, termed TimeGuard. Our method adopts channel-wise pool training as the…
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