Warhead Verification with Neutron Beams and Electric Cryptography
Nolan Kowitt, Michael Moore, Kevin Sanchez, Mital Zalavadia, Areg Danagoulian

TL;DR
This paper proposes an analog electric cryptographic system for neutron transmission analysis to verify nuclear warheads in arms control treaties while minimizing information leakage.
Contribution
It introduces a transparent, analog measurement system that enhances security and verification reliability for nuclear warhead authentication.
Findings
Developed a proof-of-concept analog cryptographic measurement system.
Demonstrated the system's ability to verify warhead authenticity with minimal information disclosure.
Proposed a transparent, verifiable apparatus suitable for treaty verification.
Abstract
Future arms control treaties may need to reliably verify warheads for dismantlement as part of the treaty verification process without exposing carefully guarded weapons information. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis has been proposed as a strategy to verify the authenticity of nuclear warheads and warhead components slated for dismantlement in an arms control verification exercise. Most actinides have resonant neutron absorption lines in the eV region, so by measuring the energy resolved transmission of neutrons and observing the resulting isotope-specific absorption lines, the authenticity of a nuclear device can be verified. To ensure acceptance of this technique by treaty partners, the measurement should minimize information learned about the warhead, including both geometric and isotopic features. Past implementations of transmission analysis acquired and compared neutron…
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