GenAI-FDIA: Physics-Informed Generative Models for False Data Injection Attacks
Mohammad A. Razzaque, Muta Tah Hira

TL;DR
This paper introduces extsc{GenAI-FDIA}, a framework benchmarking physics-informed generative models for false data injection attacks in power systems, addressing data scarcity and model fidelity issues.
Contribution
It evaluates diverse physics-compliant generative architectures for attack synthesis, identifies failure modes, and proposes solutions to enhance attack stealthiness and model robustness.
Findings
All architectures achieved evasion rates of ≥86.6% on the 14-bus network.
Applying affine physics projections in normalized space critically reduces attack evasion.
A novel inference-time harmoniser restores full attack stealthiness without retraining.
Abstract
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex distributional structures imposed by network physics. We present \textsc{GenAI-FDIA}, a framework benchmarking a pool of architectures for physics-compliant FDIA synthesis, spanning Wasserstein GANs, MMD-VAEs, normalising flows, diffusion models, and cross-family hybrids. These are evaluated across three IEEE testbeds (14-bus DC, 30-bus DC, and 14-bus AC) under a 60/20/20 chronological split using data-driven Bad Data Detection (BDD) threshold calibration. Our empirical results verify that these models generate high-fidelity attacks, with all architectures achieving evasion rates of on the 14-bus network; additionally,…
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