Scale-Dependent Collective Adaptation in Self-Amending LLM Societies: A Cross-Family Study of Emergent Governance
Kazuya Horibe, Masaomi Hatakeyama, Gen Masumoto, Takashi Hashimoto, Peter Romero

TL;DR
This study investigates how collective decision-making and governance evolve across different model sizes and configurations in self-amending AI societies, revealing non-monotonic scale effects and complex adaptive behaviors.
Contribution
It introduces a cross-family analysis of emergent governance in self-amending LLM societies, highlighting non-monotonic scale-dependent collective adaptation patterns.
Findings
Collective adaptation peaks at a narrow mid-scale regime.
Larger models tend to favor restrictive voting patterns.
Heterogeneous groups often experience veto-driven gridlock.
Abstract
We study group decision-making in artificial societies where the rules of play are themselves subject to collective amendment. Using the self-amending game Nomic, we compare multiple scales across two LLM families and find that collective adaptation does not improve monotonically with model size. Instead, both families exhibit a narrow mid-scale regime that supports sustained rule adoption, diverse amendments, and balanced consensus. Smaller models tend to remain rule-inert, whereas larger models often converge on restrictive voting patterns, and heterogeneous mixed-size groups collapse into veto-driven gridlock. These cross-scale contrasts persist under temperature perturbations and under a shift from unanimity to majority voting, although latent-state structure varies by family and scale. Hidden-state divergence alone does not explain collective performance: high representational…
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