Modeling Coincident Peak Pricing in Electricity Markets: Challenges and Peak Shaving Effectiveness
Qian Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Lucy Diao, Conleigh Byers, Yiling Chen, Derya Cansever, Le Xie

TL;DR
This paper presents a game-theoretic framework to analyze and improve the effectiveness of Coincident Peak pricing in electricity markets, emphasizing the roles of information signals, flexibility, and control resolution.
Contribution
It introduces a coupled nonlinear model with decision dynamics to evaluate peak shaving strategies, providing practical guidance for system operators and consumers.
Findings
Fictitious-play dynamics reliably reduce system peaks.
Best-response dynamics can increase peaks under tight capacity.
Finer action resolution and increased flexibility improve peak shaving.
Abstract
Coincident Peak (CP) pricing is widely used in U.S. electricity markets to allocate capacity and transmission costs. This paper develops a behavioral game-theoretic framework for CP-driven load shifting that couples a nonlinear cost-allocation model with day-ahead (one-shot) and real-time (sequential-learning) decision processes. We examine two update rules, namely best-response dynamics (BRD) and fictitious-play dynamics (FPD), across continuous and finite action spaces to quantify how flexibility, action resolution, and participation influence peak outcomes. Using ERCOT peak-day data, we find that FPD reliably reduces system peaks, whereas BRD is more variable and can increase peaks under tight-capacity conditions. Finer action resolution improves peak shaving, while the number of participants is largely neutral when aggregate flexibility is fixed. Meanwhile, information-provider…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
