Detecting Privilege Escalation in Polyglot Microservices via Agentic Program Analysis
Penghui Li, Hong Yau Chong, Yinzhi Cao, and Junfeng Yang

TL;DR
This paper introduces Neo, an innovative agentic program analysis framework that combines large language models with traditional analysis to detect privilege escalation vulnerabilities in complex polyglot microservice architectures.
Contribution
Neo is the first framework to integrate LLMs with classic program analysis for scalable privilege vulnerability detection across diverse microservices and languages.
Findings
Uncovered 24 zero-day privilege escalation vulnerabilities in open-source microservices.
Achieved 81.0% precision and 85.0% recall on a ground-truth dataset.
Demonstrated Neo's extensibility by finding 18 additional vulnerabilities in other domains.
Abstract
Microservices are widely adopted in modern cloud systems due to their scalability and fault tolerance. However, microservice architectures introduce significant complexity in privilege and permission control, creating risks of privilege escalation where attackers can gain unauthorized access to resources or operations. Detecting such vulnerabilities is challenging due to complex cross-service interactions, polyglot codebases, and diverse privileged operations and permission checks. We present Neo, an agentic program analysis framework that combines large language models (LLMs) with classic program analysis to address these challenges. Neo leverages an LLM-based agent that dynamically generates analysis plans, adapts code search strategies, and validates semantics. We develop code search primitives that enable Neo to perform scalable and flexible code exploration across services and…
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