Distributionally Robust Nash Equilibrium Seeking with Partial Observations and Distributed Communication
Nirabhra Mandal, Sonia Mart\'inez

TL;DR
This paper develops a distributed algorithm for agents in stochastic games to find distributionally robust Nash equilibria using partial observations and communication, ensuring robustness against distributional uncertainty.
Contribution
It introduces a novel inertial supergradient dynamics algorithm for distributed computation of distributionally robust Nash equilibria with partial and shared data.
Findings
Proved existence of distributionally robust Nash equilibria under certain conditions.
Designed a distributed algorithm (d-ISBRAG) that converges to the robust equilibria.
Validated the approach with simulations demonstrating effectiveness.
Abstract
In this work, we study stochastic one-shot games where agents' utilities depend on the collective strategy profiles of other agents as well as on some well-behaved randomness. While each decision-maker is agnostic to the random variable's underlying distribution, they have access to finitely many i.i.d. samples generated from it. We consider two cases: one where samples are shared; and another, more special one, where samples are individually accessible. To hedge against the unknown uncertainty, each agent plays a distributionally robust game and aims to maximize the worst-case expected utility over a Wasserstein ball around the sample average distribution. In this setting, we provide conditions under which the game has a non-empty set of distributionally robust Nash equilibria (DRoNE) and then characterize the closeness of the DRoNE set to the Nash equilibria (NE) of the associated…
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