Making AFDM Secure Against Eavesdroppers: A Phase Function Design Approach

TL;DR

This paper proposes a phase function design for AFDM waveforms to significantly improve physical layer security against brute-force eavesdroppers, while maintaining waveform robustness.

Contribution

It introduces a novel phase function design that increases brute-force demodulation complexity, enhancing AFDM security without compromising its Doppler resilience.

Findings

Proposed phase functions can increase demodulation complexity unboundedly.

Simulation shows several orders of magnitude improvement in security performance.

Design preserves AFDM's chirp structure and robustness.

Abstract

Affine frequency division multiplexing (AFDM) has recently emerged as a promising waveform for high-mobility communications due to its resilience to Doppler effects and its advantages for integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). AFDM modulates transmit data symbols using chirp subcarriers with two adjustable parameters. One is used for dealing with the Doppler effect and the second parameter can be used for physical layer security (PLS). In this paper, we focus on designing the second chirp parameter in the form of a generic phase function to enhance the robustness of the waveform against brute-force demodulation by the eavesdropper. In particular, we first derive a design criterion that reveals the brute-force demodulation complexity depends on the first derivative of the phase function. Then, we introduce a family of phase functions that can increase the brute-force demodulation complexity in an unbounded and controllable manner, while preserving chirp structure of AFDM. Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed phase function design enhances the PLS performance of AFDM by several orders of magnitude compared with the conventional AFDM in terms of brute-force demodulation complexity.