Capacitive Touchscreens at Risk: A Practical Side-Channel Attack on Smartphones via Electromagnetic Emanations
Yukun Cheng, Changhai Ou, Shiyu Zhu, Jinyuan Zhang, Zhenfang Qiu, Xingshuo Han, Tianwei Zhang, Yuan Li, Shihui Zheng

TL;DR
This paper introduces TESLA, a contactless electromagnetic side-channel attack that exploits EM emanations during touchscreen scanning to infer sensitive user inputs on smartphones.
Contribution
TESLA is a novel, practical EM side-channel attack that broadens attack targets and improves efficiency over existing methods for extracting sensitive touchscreen information.
Findings
Achieves 99.3% PIN recognition accuracy
Reconstructs keyboard inputs with 97.6% accuracy
Successfully infers application categories and handwriting trajectories
Abstract
Capacitive touchscreens in modern smartphones introduce severe side-channel vulnerabilities. However, existing attacks often require restrictive conditions or invasive measurements. This paper presents TESLA, a novel, contactless electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attack that exploits inherent EM emanations during touchscreen scanning. We demonstrate that these emanations encode the spatiotemporal evolution of touch interactions, forming a unified leakage basis. By secretly placing an EM probe near the victim's device, TESLA enables attackers to extract highly sensitive information, including screen-unlocking PIN codes, keyboard inputs, interacting application categories, and continuous handwriting trajectories. Compared to existing attacks, TESLA offers a broader range of attack targets, more efficient sample acquisition, and operations in practical attack scenarios. Extensive…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
