Admittance-Guided Inverter Dispatch Command Manipulation Attack: A Grid Stability-Oriented Approach
Hongwei Zhen, Ze Yu, Xin Xiang, Mingyang Sun, Wuhua Li

TL;DR
This paper presents a novel cyber-attack framework targeting inverter dispatch commands in microgrids, using admittance reconstruction and stability optimization to identify vulnerabilities and induce severe oscillations.
Contribution
It introduces an admittance-guided approach combining neural networks and optimization to find the most destabilizing inverter commands without requiring detailed system knowledge.
Findings
The attack can induce severe sub-synchronous oscillations within nominal dispatch bounds.
The proposed method accurately reconstructs inverter admittance for vulnerability assessment.
Hardware-in-the-loop experiments validate the effectiveness of the attack strategy.
Abstract
The high penetration of voltage source converters in modern smart microgrids enhances operational flexibility while introducing complex cyber-physical vulnerabilities. Existing cyber-attack studies either require detailed knowledge of system topology and controller dynamics or depend on repeated online interactions, which may compromise practicality by generating operationally infeasible or limit-violating commands. This article investigates a dispatch command manipulation attack and develops an admittance-guided framework to identify the vulnerable inverter and the worst-case dispatch command that most severely degrades system stability. A compromised inverter is utilized to inject controlled harmonic perturbations for sparse admittance measurement, and a physics-informed neural network is then employed to reconstruct the operating-point-dependent admittance of target inverters over…
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