ThermalTap: Passive Application Fingerprinting in VR Headsets via Thermal Side Channels
Mahsin Bin Akram, A H M Nazmus Sakib, OFM Riaz Rahman Aranya, Raveen Wijewickrama, Kevin Desai, and Murtuza Jadliwala

TL;DR
ThermalTap demonstrates a passive, non-contact side-channel attack that accurately fingerprints VR applications by analyzing thermal radiation emitted by headsets, revealing significant privacy risks.
Contribution
This work introduces ThermalTap, the first system to passively identify VR applications using thermal side channels without device interaction or software execution.
Findings
Achieves over 90% accuracy indoors with 10 seconds of data
Identifies applications outdoors with up to 81% accuracy
Reveals thermal radiation as a fundamental privacy vulnerability
Abstract
Standalone virtual reality (VR) headsets process highly sensitive personal, professional, and health-related data, yet their susceptibility to non-contact physical side channels remains largely unexplored. Existing side-channel attacks typically require malicious software execution or physical access to peripherals, making them conspicuous and potentially patchable. This paper introduces ThermalTap, the first passive, non-contact side-channel attack that fingerprints VR applications solely from the long-wave infrared (LWIR) radiation emitted by the headset chassis. By treating a headset's thermal signature as a high-fidelity proxy for internal computational workloads, ThermalTap enables remote application inference at meter-scale distances without any device interaction. To achieve robust performance in real-world settings, the system combines a commodity thermal camera with a…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
