Towards Model-Free Learning in Dynamic Population Games: An Application to Karma Economies
Matteo Cederle, Saverio Bolognani, and Gian Antonio Susto

TL;DR
This paper advances model-free learning in dynamic population games, specifically Karma economies, by analyzing deep reinforcement learning methods for agents to learn equilibria without full game knowledge.
Contribution
It introduces a framework for agents to learn Nash equilibria in Karma DPGs using deep Q-networks and fictitious play, without requiring complete game models.
Findings
Deep Q-Networks achieve suboptimality bounds related to replay buffer size and population size.
Agents can empirically converge to near-equilibrium configurations using model-free deep RL methods.
The approach supports practical deployment of Karma economies for fair resource allocation.
Abstract
Dynamic Population Games (DPGs) provide a tractable framework for modeling strategic interactions in large populations of self-interested agents, and have been successfully applied to the design of Karma economies, a class of fair non-monetary resource allocation mechanisms. Despite their appealing theoretical properties, existing computational tools for DPGs assume full knowledge of the game model and operate in a centralized fashion, limiting their applicability in realistic settings where agents have access only to their own private experience. This paper takes a step towards addressing this gap by studying model-free equilibrium learning in Karma DPGs. First, we analyze the setting in which a novel agent joins a Karma DPG already at its Stationary Nash Equilibrium (SNE) and learns a policy via Deep Q-Networks (DQN) without knowledge of the game model. Leveraging recent convergence…
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