Resolution-Aware Perpetual Futures on Binary Prediction Markets: An Empirical Risk-Design Framework Using Polymarket Data

TL;DR

This paper introduces a resolution-aware risk-design framework for perpetual binary prediction-market futures, empirically evaluated using Polymarket data, highlighting its strengths and limitations in real-world scenarios.

Contribution

It proposes a novel, comprehensive risk-management framework tailored for perpetual futures on binary prediction markets, with empirical validation and analysis of its practical constraints.

Findings

Boundary depth asymmetry and terminal-jump magnitude pass stylized facts.

Final-hour liquidation reduces pooled PnL by 6%, drawdown by 5.1%.

Final-hour halt construction results in 80% liquidation, with increased bad-debt frequency.

Abstract

We develop and counterfactually evaluate a resolution-aware risk-design framework (PIRAP) for perpetual futures whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The framework specifies six components: an index estimator combining mid-price, depth-weighted mid, and time-decayed VWAP; jump-aware tiered margin sized against bounded-event terminal-collapse magnitude; leverage compression schedule contracting toward resolution; resolution-aware funding rule with boundary-aware correction; a multi-stage halt protocol; and an eligibility framework. Two formal non-portability propositions establish that standard basis-only funding paired with continuous-vol static margin fails on bounded-event underlyings. Empirical evaluation uses Polymarket's PMXT v2 archive for 2026-04-21 to 2026-04-27 (13,298-market analysis sample passing adequacy gates from 61,087 ingested; 13,115 resolved within the empirical window for E3). E1 evaluates two pre-registered stylized facts; E2 conducts counterfactual replay across three engine configurations; E3 isolates the resolution-zone protocol's contribution. Results are mixed. Five pre-registered floors: stylized-fact floors (boundary depth asymmetry, terminal-jump magnitude) PASS; welfare-side directional floors (final-hour liquidation -6%, drawdown -5.1% pooled, median PnL +14%) two FAIL one PASS; E3 mechanic floors (final-hour liquidation -80% by halt construction PASS; bad-debt frequency +2.4% FAIL). Three of five materiality floors fail: the framework as specified does not validate deployment, but the empirical record establishes a halt-versus-margin scope distinction (halt addresses execution-channel risk; terminal-jump bad-debt remains margin-side) and documents a pre-emption trade-off constraining the dynamic-margin component. The paper concludes with structural recommendations and explicit non-deployable status.