The Vote-Left Equilibrium: A Deterministic Coordination Strategy for the Faithful in The Traitors
Vince Knight

TL;DR
This paper introduces the Vote-Left protocol, a deterministic voting strategy in social deduction games that improves the Faithful's chances of winning by deterring Traitor collusion and ensuring predictable voting behavior.
Contribution
The Vote-Left protocol is a novel deterministic voting rule that forms a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and enhances the Faithful's success probability in the game.
Findings
Vote-Left aligns with random voting under full compliance.
It forms a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in certain game states.
Raises Faithful's winning probability by about three times over random voting with collusion.
Abstract
The Traitors is a social deduction game in which an informed minority of Traitors face an uninformed majority of Faithful, and the recurring question facing the Faithful is how to vote. Random voting is known to be optimal for the uninformed majority under simultaneous-signal protocols [Braverman, Etesami and Mossel, 2008], but when votes are cast individually, random votes are indistinguishable from strategic ones and the Faithful remain exposed to coordinated Traitor collusion. We introduce the Vote-Left protocol, a deterministic rule under which every player votes for the next surviving player in a fixed cyclic ordering. Under full compliance every surviving player receives exactly one vote, so the banishment distribution coincides with random voting; since prescribed votes are deterministic functions of public information, any deviation is immediately identifiable.…
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