Learning from Acceptance: Cumulative Regret in the Game of Coding
Hanzaleh Akbari Nodehi, Parsa Moradi, and Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali

TL;DR
This paper models a game-theoretic scenario where a data collector learns to select acceptance rules in the presence of a strategic adversary, aiming to minimize cumulative regret over repeated interactions.
Contribution
It introduces an algorithm for the incomplete-information game of coding that learns acceptance strategies with sublinear cumulative regret, considering the full learning trajectory.
Findings
The proposed algorithm achieves sublinear cumulative regret.
Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the learning approach.
The method refines acceptance rule search around promising options.
Abstract
Classical coding-theoretic guarantees often rely on trust assumptions, such as requiring sufficiently many honest nodes compared with adversarial ones. These assumptions are difficult to enforce in open decentralized systems where participants are not centrally certified. At the same time, such environments often contain incentive mechanisms: participants may be rewarded only when their submitted data are accepted and the system remains functional. This changes the role of an adversary. Rather than acting as a pure saboteur, a strategic adversary may submit data that are consistent enough to be accepted while still degrading the quality of the final estimate. The game-of-coding framework models this strategic interaction between a data collector (DC) and an adversary. Existing works on the game of coding mostly consider the complete-information case, where the DC knows how the…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
