Strategic commitments shape collective cybersecurity under AI inequality
Adeela Bashir, Zia Ush Shamszaman, Zhao Song, Matjaz Perc, The Anh Han

TL;DR
This paper models how differential access to AI cybersecurity tools affects system security, showing that targeted subsidies for committed defenders enhance overall resilience against attacks.
Contribution
It introduces an evolutionary game-theoretic model analyzing AI access inequality and demonstrates that targeted subsidies improve cybersecurity stability.
Findings
Subsidies increase adoption of strong defenses among defenders.
Strong defenders and subsidies reduce successful attacks.
Social welfare improves with targeted support for key defenders.
Abstract
The growing integration of AI into cybersecurity is reshaping the balance between attackers and defenders. When access to advanced AI-enabled defence tools is uneven, resource-limited defenders may be unable to adopt effective protection, creating persistent system vulnerabilities. We study the impact of differential AI access using an evolutionary game-theoretic model in a finite population. We first show that when high-capability defence is costly, the population is driven toward low-cost, weak-defence behaviour, sustaining attacks and weakening long-run security. To address this problem, we introduce differential access to AI defence tools by allowing defenders to choose between low- and high-capability protection based on their resources. We then examine the role of a small group of committed defenders who always adopt strong defence and influence others through social learning.…
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