EquiMem: Calibrating Shared Memory in Multi-Agent Debate via Game-Theoretic Equilibrium
Yuqiao Meng, Sakshi Sunil Narvekar, Luoxi Tang, Rupali Rajendra Vaje, Yingxue Zhang, Muchao Ye, Zhaohan Xi

TL;DR
EquiMem introduces a game-theoretic approach to calibrate shared memory in multi-agent debates, enhancing robustness against corrupted entries without relying on additional AI judgments.
Contribution
It formulates memory updating as a zero-trust game and proposes an inference-time calibration mechanism applicable across various memory architectures.
Findings
Outperforms existing safeguards across multiple benchmarks
Remains robust under adversarial agents
Incur negligible inference overhead
Abstract
Multi-agent debate (MAD) systems increasingly rely on shared memory to support long-horizon reasoning, but this convenience opens a critical vulnerability: a single corrupted entry can contaminate the downstream memory-augmented reasoning, and debate alone fails to filter such errors. Existing safeguards filter entries via heuristics or LLM-based validation, yet they rely on AI judgments that share the same failure modes and overlook the cross-agent dynamics of MAD. We address this gap by formulating memory updating in MAD as a zero-trust memory game, in which no agent is assumed honest and the game's equilibrium serves as an indicator of optimal memory trust. Guided by this equilibrium, we propose EquiMem, an inference-time calibration mechanism that quantifies each update algorithmically against the shared memory state, using agents' existing retrieval queries and traversal paths as…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
