Spying Across Chiplets: Side-Channel Attacks in 2.5/3D Integrated Systems

TL;DR

This paper reveals that side-channel attacks can be conducted across chiplets in 2.5D/3D integrated systems by repurposing communication interfaces as internal observation points, posing new security risks.

Contribution

It introduces a novel threat model and demonstrates experimentally that communication-oriented chiplet interfaces can be exploited for side-channel attacks within integrated systems.

Findings

Signals from communication interfaces can leak information about neighboring chiplet activity.

Experimental results confirm the feasibility of cross-chiplet side-channel attacks.

Repurposing communication interfaces as observation points is a viable attack vector.

Abstract

Advanced packaging and chiplet-based integration are increasingly adopted to build complex heterogeneous systems beyond the limits of monolithic scaling. While these architectures offer major benefits in terms of modularity, yield, and performance, they also introduce new physical attack surfaces. In this paper, we show that side-channel attacks can be mounted across chiplets within the same package or stack. Our key idea is that a communication-oriented chiplet, originally intended to interact with the external environment through an antenna, an RFID-like element, or another contactless coupling structure, can be repurposed as an internal observation platform. We formalize this threat through a realistic adversary model, describe the corresponding attack principle, and experimentally assess its feasibility. The obtained results demonstrate that signals captured through such a communication-oriented interface can reveal information correlated with the activity of a neighboring victim chiplet.