Securing the Web with HSTS-Enforced
Aaron van Diepen, Adrian Zapletal, Fernando Kuipers

TL;DR
HSTS-Enforced is a new mechanism that shifts web security from an opt-in to an opt-out model, effectively preventing TLS stripping attacks while maintaining website accessibility and compatibility.
Contribution
It introduces a novel opt-out security model with DNS and preload indicators, enhancing protection against TLS stripping without sacrificing HTTP accessibility.
Findings
Blocks all practical TLS stripping attempts
Maintains compatibility for sites requiring HTTP
No overhead in typical deployment scenarios
Abstract
TLS stripping attacks expose sensitive web traffic by forcing secure HTTPS connections to fall back to unencrypted HTTP. At present, protection against these attacks relies on website operators explicitly opting into security by deploying mechanisms such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers. These mechanisms have significant limitations: some are weak or difficult to configure, which raises the risk of misconfiguration and reduces practical adoption; others violate HTTP backward compatibility; at least one can even be abused to enable unintended user tracking. We introduce HSTS-Enforced, a mechanism that eliminates the remaining attack surface for TLS stripping while still allowing operators to securely specify that their websites need to be accessed over HTTP when necessary, thereby maintaining accessibility. To achieve this, we flip the current opt-in security model to…
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