Honest Reporting in Scored Oversight: True-KL0 Property via the Prekopa Principle
Lauri Lov\'en

TL;DR
This paper proves the True-KL0 property for a family of scoring rules in AI oversight and forecasting, ensuring honest reporting is always optimal and quantifying the bounds of misreporting.
Contribution
It introduces a novel proof of the True-KL0 property for heterogeneous scoring rules using the Prekopa principle and high-precision numerical methods.
Findings
True-KL0 holds unconditionally for dimensions d=2,3,4.
The property fails for dimensions d≥5 above a critical p-value.
An explicit formula and structural tools underpin the proof.
Abstract
We prove the True-KL property for a parametric family of heterogeneous scoring rules arising in scored elicitation mechanisms (AI oversight, forecasting competitions, expert surveys). A -dimensional agent with private type reports to a principal who evaluates via a power- pseudospherical scoring rule, ; captures the agent's information quality relative to a reference. An exact formula shows DSIC unconditionally: honest reporting maximises expected score for every , without distributional assumptions. True-KL, the property for all , , , gives an explicit gain-magnitude bound: the best misreport is always worse than the honest score itself. Two structural tools drive the proof: (i) a substitution rewrites the loss integral as $\int_1^M…
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