Quantum Vault: Secure Token Authentication Without Classical State Information Benchmarked on IBMQ
Lucas Tsunaki, Boris Naydenov

TL;DR
This paper introduces a quantum vault protocol for secure token authentication that removes classical side information, is benchmarked on IBMQ hardware, and offers unforgeability, traceability, and public verifiability.
Contribution
It proposes a quantum vault scheme that enhances security by eliminating classical side information and demonstrates its effectiveness on cloud-based quantum hardware.
Findings
Achieves false-negative error probabilities below 10^{-4}
Attains attack success probabilities below 10^{-18} with 200 tokens
Protocol is hardware-agnostic and applicable to various quantum platforms
Abstract
Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is a hacker that steals the classical side information of the token states from the issuing agent (e.g. a bank), allowing the forgery of fake tokens without violating no-cloning theorem. Our proposal avoids this threat by removing classical side information about the token states, where instead a copy of the token is stored at the bank, i.e. a quantum vault. This copy can be accessed by anyone to perform authentication, consuming the token pair in the process. Our protocol is benchmarked and quality parameters are identified within a hardware agnostic framework employing three cloud-based IBM quantum (IBMQ) processors, such that the protocol is applicable to arbitrary…
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