A Mission-Centric Cyber-Resilience Benchmark for Silent-Watch Operation of Electrified Ground-Platform Power Architectures
Hongyu Wu, Raul Rodriguez

TL;DR
This paper introduces a mission-centric cyber-resilience benchmark for electrified ground platforms operating silently, linking battery SOC spoofing to mission outcomes and evaluating defense strategies.
Contribution
It develops a novel benchmark connecting SOC spoofing to mission success, incorporating a reduced-order model, detection methods, fallback strategies, and mission metrics.
Findings
SOC spoofing creates a structured stealth-impact envelope.
Small biases have limited mission effect; larger biases cause significant endurance loss.
Defense effectiveness depends on fallback depth, not detection alone.
Abstract
Silent-watch operation makes electrified ground platforms depend on supervisory energy management because mission loads must be sustained from stored energy while the engine is off. This paper develops a mission-centric cyber-resilience benchmark for this operating mode. The benchmark connects battery state-of-charge (SOC) spoofing to mission outcomes rather than evaluating the attack only through detector response or control error. It combines a reduced-order DC-bus model, residual-based detection, fallback shedding, and five mission-facing metrics for endurance, critical-load service, priority-weighted loss-of-load cost, unsafe-voltage exposure, and detection delay. The study shows that SOC spoofing creates a structured stealth-versus-impact envelope. Small biases have limited mission effect, intermediate biases produce an endurance deficit well approximated by a first-order…
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