Moral Hazard in LTI Dynamics: A Hypothesis Testing Approach
Jaewon Jeong, Pan-Yang Su, S. Shankar Sastry, and Anil Aswani

TL;DR
This paper models moral hazard in control systems with linear dynamics, proposing an optimal payment scheme based on hypothesis testing to incentivize agents to select cost-effective controllers.
Contribution
It introduces a hypothesis testing approach to design optimal payments in control systems under moral hazard with linear dynamics and risk-averse agents.
Findings
Optimal payment scheme uses likelihood ratio hypothesis testing.
The approach is demonstrated in power systems load frequency control.
Application to wellness interventions for weight loss.
Abstract
Many incentive design problems must contend with information asymmetries due to non-observation of efficiency (adverse selection) or non-observation of effort (moral hazard). And although a growing body of literature considers incentive design in control systems, the problem of designing incentives for control systems under information asymmetries has been less well-studied. This paper considers a model of moral hazard within control systems. In our model, the control system is described by an (affine) linear time-invariant (LTI) system with process noise. There is an agent who gets to choose (from between two choices) a linear state-feedback controller to apply to the LTI system, with one of the state-feedback controllers having a higher quadratic cost on the control inputs than the other. Our goal is to design a payment scheme that incentivizes the agent to choose the state-feedback…
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