Latent Adversarial Detection: Adaptive Probing of LLM Activations for Multi-Turn Attack Detection
Prashant Kulkarni

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel activation-level signature called adversarial restlessness for detecting multi-turn prompt injection attacks in large language models, achieving high detection accuracy with specific training data.
Contribution
It demonstrates that activation trajectory features can reliably identify covert multi-turn attacks, with model-specific probes and insights into data requirements for deployment.
Findings
Detection accuracy reaches 93.8% on synthetic data.
Probes are model-specific and do not transfer across architectures.
Combined multi-source training achieves 89.4% detection with low false positives.
Abstract
Multi-turn prompt injection follows a known attack path -- trust-building, pivoting, escalation but text-level defenses miss covert attacks where individual turns appear benign. We show this attack path leaves an activation-level signature in the model's residual stream: each phase shift moves the activation, producing a total path length far exceeding benign conversations. We call this adversarial restlessness. Five scalar trajectory features capturing this signal lift conversation-level detection from 76.2% to 93.8% on synthetic held-out data. The signal replicates across four model families (24B-70B); probes are model-specific and do not transfer across architectures. Generalization is source-dependent: leave-one-source-out evaluation shows each of synthetic, LMSYS-Chat-1M, and SafeDialBench captures distinct attack distributions, with detection on real-world LMSYS reaching 47-71%…
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