Prime-Field PINI: Machine-Checked Composition Theorems for Post-Quantum NTT Masking
Ray Iskander, Khaled Kirah

TL;DR
This paper presents the first machine-checked theorems for arithmetic masking over prime fields in post-quantum cryptography, formalizing security properties and diagnosing vulnerabilities in hardware implementations.
Contribution
It introduces novel formal composition theorems for prime-field masking, bridging algebraic and hardware models, and applies them to analyze a real cryptographic accelerator.
Findings
Formalized theorems in Lean 4 with 18 proofs and no stubs.
Diagnosed a security flaw in Microsoft's PQC accelerator due to lack of fresh masking.
Suggests the 1-Bit Barrier is universal across Barrett and Montgomery reductions.
Abstract
This is Paper 6 of a series of formally-verified analyses of masked NTT hardware for post-quantum cryptography; Paper 1 [1] established structural dependency analysis of the QANARY platform, and Paper 2 [2] quantified security margins under partial NTT masking. Boolean masking composition is well-understood through NI, SNI, and PINI. Arithmetic masking over for prime , the foundation of NTT-based post-quantum cryptography, has lacked an analogous theory. We prove, to our knowledge, the first machine-checked composition theorems for arithmetic masking over prime fields. Our key insight is the renewal argument: when a fresh random mask is applied between two pipeline stages, the intermediate wire becomes perfectly uniform regardless of Stage 1's security parameter. For two PF-PINI gadgets with parameters and , the composed two-stage pipeline with fresh masking…
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