Machine-Checked Cardinality Bounds for Masked Barrett Reduction: A 1-Bit Side-Channel Leakage Barrier in Post-Quantum Cryptographic Hardware
Ray Iskander, Khaled Kirah

TL;DR
This paper establishes a machine-checked, universal cardinality bound for masked Barrett reduction in post-quantum cryptography, demonstrating a 1-bit leakage barrier in hardware implementations.
Contribution
It introduces the 1-Bit Barrier and PF-PINI, providing the first formal, machine-checked cardinality bounds for masked Barrett reduction over prime fields.
Findings
Proves the 1-Bit Barrier for internal wire map preimages
Introduces PF-PINI for prime-field masking satisfaction
Machine-checked 12 results in Lean 4 confirming bounds
Abstract
Barrett reduction is the nonlinear core of every practical NTT-based post-quantum cryptography implementation. Existing composition frameworks (ISW, t-SNI, PINI, DOM) address Boolean masking over GF(2); none provides a machine-checked characterization of Barrett's leakage under first-order arithmetic masking and the first-order probing model over prime fields. Building on our prior series, QANARY [15], partial-NTT-masking margins [14], algebraic foundations [16], and butterfly composition [18], we close this gap. We prove a trichotomy: for any and shift , the Barrett internal wire map has preimage cardinality in , never more. We call this the 1-Bit Barrier: max-multiplicity 2 implies at most 1 bit of min-entropy loss per internal wire, universal over all moduli. The count-zero cases, unreachable output values, reveal…
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