ARCANE: Cross-Campaign Attacker Re-identification via Passive Beacon Telemetry -- A Bayesian Network Framework for Longitudinal Cyber Attribution
Abraham Itzhak Weinberg

TL;DR
This paper introduces ARCANE, a Bayesian network framework that aggregates passive beacon telemetry across campaigns to improve long-term cyber adversary attribution, revealing structural limits in current feature-based methods.
Contribution
ARCANE is a novel probabilistic framework that models and updates persistent adversary fingerprints using longitudinal passive telemetry data.
Findings
Cross-campaign aggregation does not fully resolve attribution ambiguity.
Inter-actor similarity remains high due to shared operational practices.
Feature indistinguishability limits attribution accuracy despite aggregation.
Abstract
Current cyber attribution approaches typically operate on a per-incident basis, leaving open whether aggregating evidence across campaigns improves adversary identification. We investigate whether cross-campaign attribution reduces ambiguity or whether structural limits persist under longitudinal data. We model adversary fingerprints as multi-dimensional feature vectors encoding behavioral, infrastructural, and temporal characteristics derived from covert beacon interactions. We introduce ARCANE (Attacker Re-identification via Cross-campaign Attribution Network), a probabilistic framework that aggregates passive telemetry across campaigns and organizations to construct persistent adversary fingerprints. These fingerprints are updated using a Bayesian belief network that integrates new evidence over time. A time-decayed confidence metric captures accumulated similarity across campaigns.…
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