RowHammer Vulnerability Counter (RVC): Redefining RowHammer Detection with Victim-Centric Tracking
Lavi Jain, Venkata Kalyan Tavva

TL;DR
The paper introduces RVC, a new Rowhammer mitigation framework that focuses on assessing actual vulnerability to bit flips, significantly reducing unnecessary refreshes and improving efficiency over existing methods.
Contribution
RVC shifts from activation count tracking to vulnerability evaluation, enhancing detection accuracy and efficiency without additional space overhead.
Findings
RVC achieves 95-99.99% reduction in mitigation refreshes compared to Graphene.
RVC reduces LLC latency by up to 76.91%.
RVC improves energy efficiency in DRAM systems.
Abstract
The Rowhammer vulnerability poses an increasing challenge with newer generations of DRAM and aggressive technology scaling. Existing mitigation techniques, such as Graphene, Twice, and Hydra, primarily rely on tracking activation counts for each row and issuing refreshes when a row reaches a predefined tracking threshold. However, these methods have inherent limitations, including inefficiencies in identifying rows genuinely at risk of bit flips. In this paper, we propose a novel framework called Rowhammer Vulnerability Count (RVC), which shifts the focus from activation count tracking to evaluating a row's actual vulnerability to bit flips. By selectively issuing refreshes only to rows on the verge of experiencing bit flips, RVC drastically reduces unnecessary refresh operations. We also demonstrate that prior works have incorrectly set tracking thresholds, leading to security flaws.…
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