Grounding Before Generalizing: How AI Differs from Humans in Causal Transfer
Liangru Xiang, Yuxi Ma, Zhihao Cao, Yixin Zhu, Song-Chun Zhu

TL;DR
This study investigates how current AI models differ from humans in transferring causal knowledge, revealing that models rely on environmental grounding and symbolic processing, limiting their ability for abstract causal transfer.
Contribution
The paper demonstrates that state-of-the-art LLMs and VLMs require environmental grounding and exhibit biases, unlike humans who transfer causal knowledge immediately without such dependencies.
Findings
Models need initial environmental-specific mapping before transfer efficiency emerges.
Visual information degrades model performance compared to text-only conditions.
Models show CC/CE asymmetries not observed in humans, indicating heuristic biases.
Abstract
Extracting abstract causal structures and applying them to novel situations is a hallmark of human intelligence. While Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown strong performance on a wide range of reasoning tasks, their capacity for interactive causal learning -- inducing latent structures through sequential exploration and transferring them across contexts -- remains uncharacterized. Human learners accomplish such transfer after minimal exposure, whereas classical Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents fail catastrophically. Whether state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) models possess human-like mechanisms for abstract causal structure transfer is an open question. Using the OpenLock paradigm requiring sequential discovery of Common Cause (CC) and Common Effect (CE) structures, here we show that models exhibit fundamentally delayed or absent…
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