Strategically Robust Aggregative Games
Andreas Feik, Nicolas Lanzetti, Saverio Bolognani, Florian D\"orfler, and Dario Paccagnan

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new equilibrium concept called strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium for aggregative games, providing a way for agents to protect against uncertain aggregate behaviors and improving decision-making in multiagent systems.
Contribution
It proposes a novel equilibrium concept that interpolates between standard and robust strategies, with existence proofs and computational methods for convex aggregative games.
Findings
Strategically robust Wardrop equilibria exist in convex aggregative games.
Robust equilibria lead to better decisions and lower costs for agents.
Robustification can induce a coordination effect among agents.
Abstract
In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete information, limited computation, or bounded rationality, ultimately impacting the aggregate behavior. To tackle this challenge, we follow recent work on strategically robust game theory and postulate that agents seek protection directly against deviations around the emergent behavior, as opposed to explicitly modeling all sources of uncertainty. Specifically, we propose that each agent protects itself against the worst-case aggregate behavior within an optimal-transport-based ambiguity set centered at the emergent aggregate population behavior. This leads to a novel equilibrium concept, called strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium, that enables one…
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