Partial exploiters sustain cooperation: the hump-shaped strategy stably coexists with unconditional cooperators

TL;DR

This study reveals that the hump-shaped strategy (Hump), which adjusts contributions based on others, coexists with unconditional cooperation and promotes large-scale cooperation in social dilemmas through stable equilibria.

Contribution

It demonstrates that the hump-shaped strategy is individually adaptive and can sustain cooperation by forming stable coexistence with unconditional cooperators in various environments.

Findings

Hump strategy is stable in intermediate-sized groups with step-like production functions.

Hump can elevate population-level cooperation despite being exploitative.

Hump and AllC strategies can form stable equilibria that exclude defectors.

Abstract

From collective hunting to environmental problems, social dilemmas are pervasive in human societies. Prior research has documented highly heterogeneous behavioral patterns in such settings. However, how this heterogeneity emerges and how it shapes large-scale cooperation remain unclear. Here, we focus on a robustly observed but underexplored pattern: the hump-shaped strategy (Hump). Individuals adopting Hump match others' contributions up to a threshold, only to reduce their own above it. Using agent-based simulations across group sizes and production-function shapes, we find that Hump is individually adaptive, especially in intermediate-sized groups with step-like production functions. Despite its exploitative nature, Hump also elevates population-level cooperation. The underlying mechanism is that Hump can form a stable equilibrium with unconditional cooperators (AllC), which jointly exclude defectors across a broad range of environments. Our findings suggest that underexplored patterns of behavioral heterogeneity -- including both Hump and AllC -- play a functional role in sustaining large-scale cooperation.