Active Inference: A method for Phenotyping Agency in AI systems?
Philip Wilson, Axel Constant, Mahault Albarracin, Nicol\'as Hinrichs, Jasmine Moore, Daniel Polani, Karl Friston

TL;DR
This paper proposes a minimal, principled framework for characterizing agency in AI systems using active inference, grounded in beliefs, rationality, and explainability, with empirical validation via a T-maze experiment.
Contribution
It introduces a variational active inference model for AI agency, operationalizes empowerment as an agency metric, and links computational phenotyping to AI governance strategies.
Findings
Empowerment distinguishes agency levels in a T-maze paradigm.
A variational framework models agency as belief-driven action.
Internal modulation of priors is key for effective epistemic foraging.
Abstract
The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves…
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