Secure estimator design for Lur'e-type systems with nonuniformly and synchronously sampled measurements under attacks [extended version]

TL;DR

This paper introduces a secure state estimator for Lur'e-type systems with non-uniform sampling, resilient to sensor attacks, and applicable to power grid monitoring.

Contribution

It presents a novel secure estimator design that guarantees accurate state estimation despite malicious sensor attacks under specific sampling conditions.

Findings

Estimator accuracy is independent of attack when less than half sensors are compromised.

Convergence of estimation error is proven using impulsive system analysis.

The method is validated on a low-voltage power distribution grid.

Abstract

Motivated by the need for real-time health monitoring of power distribution grids, we propose a secure state estimator design for continuous time Lur'e type systems with non-uniformly and synchronously sampled outputs which have potentially been maliciously corrupted. The secure state estimator provides state estimates with accuracy independent of the sensor attack, when less than half of the sensors are under attack and when all inter-sample times are upper bounded. We show convergence of the state estimation error under an impulsive system framework and provide an upper bound on the estimation error that is independent of the attack signals. The stability conditions are formulated as linear matrix inequalities, which can be used to design the observer parameters. We demonstrate the capabilities of the proposed secure state estimator on a low-voltage power distribution grid.