Adversarial Co-Evolution of Malware and Detection Models: A Bilevel Optimization Perspective
Olha Jure\v{c}kov\'a, Martin Jure\v{c}ek, Matou\v{s} Koz\'ak, R\'obert L\'orencz

TL;DR
This paper introduces a bilevel optimization framework for malware detection that models the strategic co-evolution of attackers and defenders, significantly reducing evasion rates and increasing attacker query costs.
Contribution
It presents a novel bilevel optimization approach to enhance malware detection robustness against adaptive adversaries using reinforcement learning.
Findings
Standard classifiers have evasion rates up to 90%.
The proposed method reduces evasion rates to below 2%.
It increases attacker query complexity by up to two orders of magnitude.
Abstract
Machine learning-based malware detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial examples. Traditional defenses, such as one-shot adversarial training, often fail against adaptive attackers who use reinforcement learning to bypass detection. This paper proposes a robust defense framework based on bilevel optimization, explicitly modeling the strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker as an adversarial co-evolutionary process. We evaluate our approach using the MAB-malware framework against three distinct malware families: Mokes, Strab, and DCRat. Our experimental results demonstrate that while standard classifiers and basic adversarial retraining often remain vulnerable, showing evasion rates as high as 90 %, the proposed bilevel optimization approach consistently achieves near-total immunity, reducing evasion rates to 0 - 1.89 %. Furthermore, the iterative framework…
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