Process-Mining of Hypertraces: Enabling Scalable Formal Security Verification of (Automotive) Network Architectures
Julius Figge, David Knuplesch, Andreas Maletti, Dragan Zuvic

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel integration of formal verification and process mining to analyze security vulnerabilities in automotive network architectures, enabling scalable and detailed security analysis.
Contribution
It extends security protocol verification with a verification-orchestration algorithm and applies process mining to attack traces for root cause analysis in automotive security.
Findings
Demonstrated real-world applicability with a prototype and case study.
Enabled systematic identification of attacker behavior causing security invalidations.
Extended security verification methods for automotive network protocols.
Abstract
The automotive domain is transitioning: vehicles act as rolling servers, persistently connected to numerous external entities. This connectivity, combined with rising on-board computing power for advanced driver assistance systems and similar use cases, creates escalating challenges for securing automotive network architectures. This work advances the security analysis of internet-connected automotive network architectures and their protocols. We introduce a strong, active adversary model tailored to the automotive domain. We substantially extend security protocol verification possible based on Attack Resilience Hyperproperties (ARHs) by introducing a verification-orchestration algorithm. Furthermore, we provide methods for comparative attribution of security property invalidations to specific, ne-grained component compromises. We present a novel integration of formal verification and…
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