An Analysis of Attack Vectors Against FIDO2 Authentication
Alexander Berladskyy, Andreas A{\ss}muth

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the security of FIDO2 passkeys, identifying attack vectors and demonstrating that while they are largely phishing-resistant, certain sophisticated attacks are possible with significant effort.
Contribution
It presents new attack methods against FIDO2 passkeys and evaluates their effectiveness, providing insights into their security robustness.
Findings
Successful attacks require substantial effort and resources.
Passkeys significantly raise the bar against phishing compared to passwords.
Two new attack approaches are implemented and tested.
Abstract
Phishing attacks remain one of the most prevalent threats to online security, with the Anti-Phishing Working Group reporting over 890,000 attacks in Q3 2025 alone. Traditional password-based authentication is particularly vulnerable to such attacks, prompting the development of more secure alternatives. This paper examines passkeys, also known as FIDO2, which claim to provide phishing-resistant authentication through asymmetric cryptography. In this approach, a private key is stored on a user's device, the authenticator, while the server stores the corresponding public key. During authentication, the server generates a challenge that the user signs with the private key; the server then verifies the signature and establishes a session. We present passkey workflows and review state-of-the-art attack vectors from related work alongside newly identified approaches. Two attacks are…
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