PASTA: A Patch-Agnostic Twofold-Stealthy Backdoor Attack on Vision Transformers
Dazhuang Liu, Yanqi Qiao, Rui Wang, Kaitai Liang, Georgios Smaragdakis

TL;DR
This paper introduces PASTA, a novel backdoor attack on Vision Transformers that is patch-agnostic and stealthy, exploiting the self-attention mechanism to activate across arbitrary patches with high success and robustness.
Contribution
PASTA is the first patch-agnostic, stealthy backdoor attack on ViTs that leverages a bi-level optimization framework to enhance attack effectiveness and stealthiness across arbitrary patches.
Findings
Achieves 99.13% attack success rate across arbitrary patches
Significantly improves visual and attention stealthiness (144.43x and 18.68x)
Enhances robustness against state-of-the-art defenses (2.79x)
Abstract
Vision Transformers (ViTs) have achieved remarkable success across vision tasks, yet recent studies show they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing patch-wise attacks typically assume a single fixed trigger location during inference to maximize trigger attention. However, they overlook the self-attention mechanism in ViTs, which captures long-range dependencies across patches. In this work, we observe that a patch-wise trigger can achieve high attack effectiveness when activating backdoors across neighboring patches, a phenomenon we term the Trigger Radiating Effect (TRE). We further find that inter-patch trigger insertion during training can synergistically enhance TRE compared to single-patch insertion. Prior ViT-specific attacks that maximize trigger attention often sacrifice visual and attention stealthiness, making them detectable. Based on these insights, we propose…
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