The Inference Bottleneck: A Formal Model of Vertical Foreclosure in AI Markets
Gaston Besanson

TL;DR
This paper models vertical foreclosure in AI inference markets, analyzing mechanisms like QoS discrimination, routing bias, and tier-based access, with implications for competition and policy.
Contribution
It introduces a formal game-theoretic model of inference market foreclosure mechanisms and characterizes equilibrium conditions under various parameters.
Findings
QoS discrimination increases with inference-quality importance and margins.
Routing bias is constrained by a multi-model pivot, reducing foreclosure risk.
Policy proposals aim for fairness and welfare gains in AI inference markets.
Abstract
As generative AI commercializes, competitive advantage is shifting from model training toward inference, distribution, and routing. This paper develops a formal game-theoretic model of vertical foreclosure in inference markets, as the formal-model companion to Besanson and Celani (2026). The model isolates two foreclosure mechanisms operating without predatory pricing: quality-of-service (QoS) discrimination against downstream rivals via latency, throughput, context limits, or feature access; and routing bias in assistant-layer interfaces. An extension motivated by Anthropic's April 2026 release of Claude Opus 4.7 alongside the restricted-access Claude Mythos Preview introduces a third mechanism, tier-based access discrimination, parameterized by a tier gap (tau) and partner-exclusivity (kappa). The main result gives an explicit local equilibrium characterization of the QoS gap. Under…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
