Online Trading as a Secretary Problem Variant
Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Changjun Wang, Yuchun Xiong, Qingjie Ye

TL;DR
This paper introduces an online trading variant of the secretary problem, proposing algorithms with optimal competitive ratios for maximizing final agent price under different benchmarks.
Contribution
It develops the first online algorithms with tight competitive ratios for the secretary problem variant trading, improving previous bounds and analyzing special cases.
Findings
Achieves a strong competitive ratio of approximately 3.523, the best possible.
Designs a simple online algorithm with a weak competitive ratio of 2.
Develops a double-threshold algorithm for the zero seller price case with ratio at most 1.83683.
Abstract
This paper studies an online trading variant of the classical secretary problem, called secretary problem variant trading (SPVT), from the perspective of an intermediary who facilitates trade between a seller and buyers (collectively referred to as agents). The seller has an item, and each buyer demands the item. These agents arrive sequentially in a uniformly random order to meet the intermediary, each revealing their valuation of the item upon arrival. After each arrival, the intermediary must make an immediate and irrevocable decision before the next agent appears. The intermediary's objective is to maximize the price of the agent who ultimately holds the item at the end of the process. We evaluate the performance of online algorithms for SPVT using two notions of competitive ratio: strong and weak. The strong notion benchmarks the online algorithm against a powerful offline…
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