SoK: Security of Autonomous LLM Agents in Agentic Commerce
Qian'ang Mao, Jiaxin Wang, Ya Liu, Li Zhu, Cong Ma, Jiaqi Yan

TL;DR
This paper reviews the security challenges of autonomous LLM agents in digital commerce, proposing a unified framework and layered defenses to address cross-layer attack vectors.
Contribution
It develops a comprehensive security framework for autonomous LLM agents in commerce, identifying attack vectors and proposing layered defense strategies.
Findings
12 cross-layer attack vectors identified
Failures propagate from reasoning layers to market harm
Layered defense architecture proposed
Abstract
Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents such as OpenClaw are pushing agentic commerce from human-supervised assistance toward machine actors that can negotiate, purchase services, manage digital assets, and execute transactions across on-chain and off-chain environments. Protocols such as the Trustless Agents standard (ERC-8004), Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), OKX Agent Payments Protocol (APP), the HTTP 402-based payment protocol (x402), Agent Commerce Protocol (ACP), the Agentic Commerce standard (ERC-8183), and Machine Payments Protocol (MPP) enable this transition, but they also create an attack surface that existing security frameworks do not capture well. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) develops a unified security framework for autonomous LLM agents in commerce and finance. We organize threats along five dimensions: agent integrity, transaction authorization,…
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