The Determinants of Judicial Promotion: Politics, Prestige, and Performance
Ilya Davidson, Sandro Claudio Lera, Robert Mahari

TL;DR
This study analyzes the factors influencing judicial promotions in the U.S., highlighting the roles of politics, credentials, performance, and networks through a comprehensive hazard model.
Contribution
It introduces a detailed hazard framework to quantify how political, credential, and performance factors affect judicial promotion probabilities over time.
Findings
Political alignment significantly increases promotion chances.
Elite credentials and productivity positively influence promotion.
Higher reversal rates decrease promotion likelihood.
Abstract
Judicial promotions shape the composition of higher courts, yet their determinants remain poorly understood. This paper examines promotion from U.S. District Courts to Courts of Appeals using a discrete-time hazard framework that models annual promotion probability. Using a judge-year panel covering over 36,000 observations from 1930 to present, we incorporate career timing, political alignment, elite credentials, and judicial performance measures. Promotion probabilities follow a life-cycle pattern and are strongly influenced by political alignment between judges and presidents ( = 2.12, p < 0.001). Elite credentials and productivity increase promotion likelihood, while higher reversal rates reduce it. Citation network centrality exhibits a meaningful association ( = 0.230, p = 0.025) that operates independently of elite credentials. Promotion outcomes reflect a dynamic…
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