Distinguishers for Skew and Linearized Reed-Solomon Codes
Felicitas H\"ormann, Anna-Lena Horlemann

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that generalized skew and linearized Reed-Solomon codes can be efficiently distinguished from random codes, revealing their structural properties and limitations in cryptographic applications.
Contribution
It proves that GSRS and GLRS codes decompose into GRS subcodes, making them distinguishable, and provides explicit transformations between these code types.
Findings
GSRS and GLRS codes are distinguishable from random codes using the square code method.
The distinguishability applies even with Hamming-isometric disguising.
Explicit algebraic transformations between GSRS and GLRS codes are provided.
Abstract
Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) and Gabidulin codes have been proposed for various code-based cryptosystems, though most such schemes without elaborate disguising techniques have been successfully attacked. Both code classes are prominent examples of the isometric families of (generalized) skew and linearized Reed-Solomon ((G)SRS and (G)LRS) codes which are obtained as evaluation codes from skew polynomials. Both GSRS and GLRS codes share the advantage of achieving the maximum possible error-decoding radius and thus promise smaller key sizes than e.g. Classic McEliece. We investigate whether these generalizations can avoid the known structural attacks on GRS and Gabidulin codes. In particular, we prove that both GSRS and GLRS codes decompose into GRS subcodes and are thus efficiently distinguishable from random codes with a square code method. This applies to all parameters for which…
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