Endogenous Information in Routing Games: Memory-Constrained Equilibria, Recall Braess Paradoxes, and Memory Design
Saad Alqithami

TL;DR
This paper develops a comprehensive theory for routing games with endogenous memory recall, introducing a stationary equilibrium concept, a salience-based design framework, and analyzing paradoxes like Recall Braess Paradox.
Contribution
It introduces a tractable design theory for endogenous recall in routing games, connecting micro-level memory models with a salience-based equilibrium framework.
Findings
Existence of stationary Forgetful Wardrop Equilibrium proved under mild conditions.
Unique minimizer of salience-weighted stochastic user equilibrium characterized by a convex potential.
Recall Braess Paradox demonstrated to occur on all two-terminal networks with multiple paths.
Abstract
We study routing games in which travelers optimize over routes that are remembered or surfaced, rather than over a fixed exogenous action set. The paper develops a tractable design theory for endogenous recall and then connects it back to an explicit finite-memory micro model. At the micro level, each traveler carries a finite memory state, receives surfaced alternatives, chooses via a logit rule, and updates memory under a policy such as LRU. This yields a stationary Forgetful Wardrop Equilibrium (FWE); existence is proved under mild regularity, and uniqueness follows in a contraction regime for the reduced fixed-point map. The paper's main design layer is a stationary salience model that summarizes persistent memory and interface effects as route-specific weights. Salience-weighted stochastic user equilibrium is the unique minimizer of a strictly convex potential, which yields a clean…
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