Membership Inference Attacks Expose Participation Privacy in ECG Foundation Encoders
Ziyu Wang, Elahe Khatibi, Ankita Sharma, Krishnendu Chakrabarty, Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi, Farshad Firouzi, Amir Rahmani

TL;DR
This paper evaluates membership inference attacks on ECG foundation encoders, revealing privacy risks in model reuse that can expose individual participation even without raw data disclosure.
Contribution
It provides an implementation-grounded audit of MIAs on modern ECG self-supervised encoders, highlighting privacy vulnerabilities in connected-health systems.
Findings
Participation leakage is higher in small or institution-specific cohorts.
Contrastive encoders' embeddings can saturate, revealing membership.
Larger, diverse datasets reduce the risk of participation inference.
Abstract
Foundation-style ECG encoders pretrained with self-supervised learning are increasingly reused across tasks, institutions, and deployment contexts, often through model-as-a-service interfaces that expose scalar scores or latent representations. While such reuse improves data efficiency and generalization, it raises a participation privacy concern: can an adversary infer whether a specific individual or cohort contributed ECG data to pretraining, even when raw waveforms and diagnostic labels are never disclosed? In connected-health settings, training participation itself may reveal institutional affiliation, study enrollment, or sensitive health context. We present an implementation-grounded audit of membership inference attacks (MIAs) against modern self-supervised ECG foundation encoders, covering contrastive objectives (SimCLR, TS2Vec) and masked reconstruction objectives (CNN- and…
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