On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium

TL;DR

This paper establishes that in a specific coalitional repeated game framework, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior, linking stability concepts.

Contribution

It demonstrates that the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths characterizes the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior in Greenberg's game.

Findings

Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths are a subset of Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.

The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is itself a Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.

This set is the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.

Abstract

We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.