A Deductive System for Contract Satisfaction Proofs

TL;DR

This paper introduces a deductive proof system for verifying that CPU leakage behavior satisfies security contracts, using interactive proof assistants to improve modularity and proof automation.

Contribution

It develops a sound and complete deductive system for relative trace equality, enabling modular proofs of contract satisfaction in security verification.

Findings

Formalized in Rocq proof assistant

Applied to two complex contract satisfaction proofs

Supports modular, incremental, and symmetry-exploiting proofs

Abstract

Hardware-software contracts are abstract specifications of a CPU's leakage behavior. They enable verifying the security of high-level programs against side-channel attacks without having to explicitly reason about the microarchitectural details of the CPU. Using the abstraction powers of a contract requires proving that the targeted CPU satisfies the contract in the sense that the contract over-approximates the CPU's leakage. Besides pen-and-paper reasoning, proving contract satisfaction has been approached mostly from the model-checking perspective, with approaches based on a (semi-)automated search for the necessary invariants. As an alternative, this paper explores how such proofs can be conducted in interactive proof assistants. We start by observing that contract satisfaction is an instance of a more general problem we call relative trace equality, and we introduce relative bisimulation as an associated proof technique. Leveraging recent advances in the field of coinductive proofs, we develop a deductive proof system for relative trace equality. Our system is provably sound and complete, and it enables a modular and incremental proof style. It also features several reasoning principles to simplify proofs by exploiting symmetries and transitivity properties. We formalized our deductive system in the Rocq proof assistant and applied it to two challenging contract satisfaction proofs.